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THE INSURANCE CONDITION SUBSEQUENT: A

NEEDLE IN A SEMANTIC HAYSTACK
BERTRAM HARNETT AND JOHN V. THORNTONt

I.

INTRODUCTION AND DELINEATION OF PROBLEM

Few terms in the law occupy points so ambiguous in reference as does
the term "condition." The basic difficulty of assigning meaning to conditions is often compounded by the introduction of the modifying adjectives "precedent" and "subsequent." The courts are accustomed to
using the language of conditions, but are seldom addicted to careful
analysis of the legal theory. Though the professors and the writers have
given unsparingly of their literary efforts to the logical development of
the condition problem, too often their refinements and semantic niceties
produce distinction without practical difference. To the man at the bar,
and to the apprentice, comprehension of the true nature of conditions
precedent and subsequent, and an awareness of the working utility of
the terms, are genuine tasks of mental gymnastics. There are several
fertile fields of inquiry in pursuance of this subject, but because of the
great extent of the problem,' this essay focuses directly upon a most
controversial compartment, the role of the condition subsequent in contracts of insurance. The condition subsequent has substantive and procedural implications of sizeable import in the law of insurance, and a comprehension of these implications in this lesser field facilitates understanding of such conditions in the law -of contracts generally.
For a real understanding of the conditions precedent and subsequent,
it is essential to establish the context in which the terms operate. The unfortunate coincidence that "condition" is at once a word of daily currency
in the English language, a broad legal term,' and also a narrower legal
term, creates confusion, and leads to a certain amount of mental resistance to analysis of the concepts. But this delineation must be narrowed still further for contractual application inasmuch as there are
really two levels of meaning to the condition problem in contracts.3
t Associates in Law, Columbia University, School of Law.
1. Conditions "precedent" and "subsequent" enjoy wide currency in the law of
Property, Contracts, Insurance, Sales, Trusts, Wills, and Suretyship. The legion of potential
problems is obvious.
2. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 250, comment a (1933).
3. An allied problem and one which is in some degree necessary of understanding here
is the difference between a promise and a condition. While a promise may contain a conditional term, there is nevertheless an important difference. A promise Is an undertaking
that something will or will not happen; it creates a duty in the promisor, duty being
such a legal relationship that on the breach thereof, the holder (promisee) of a corresponding right will have a cause of action for damages or specific performance. A condition,
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The first level refers to conditions which must exist in order for a valid
contract to be formed; these conditions are the facts which must exist
before there is any binding contract. The second level assumes a valid
contract has been established, and then within the contract a promisor's
actions may be subject to conditions before there is a duty of performance or a liability to recompense for a breach. On the second level the
condition is a fact which qualifies a promise of one party to the contract
in the sense that the promisor's duty to perform what he promises is
dependent on the occurrence or existence of that fact. It is on this second
level that the legal tags "precedent" and "subsquent" are typically used.
Although it is not uncommon to hear reference to a first level condition
as a condition precedent to the formation of the contract, it is on this
second level that the contract law of "conditions" is properly applicable.
on the other hand, is a fact qualifying a promise, but which imposes no duty of performance.
This difference between the promise or covenant and the condition may be shown best
by illustration.
The New York standard mortgagee clause, an endorsement to a fire insurance policy
for use in connection with first mortgage interest on real estate, reads in part: 1Loss or
damage, if any, under this policy, shall be payable to the aforesaid mortgagee, as interest
may appear, and this insurance, as to the interest of the mortgagee only therein, shall not
be invalidated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner of the within described
property, nor by any foreclosure or other proceedings or notice of sale relating to the
property, nor by the occupation of the premises for purposes more hazardous than are
permitted by this policy; provided, that in case the mortgagor or owners shall neglect to
pay any premium due under this policy, the mortgagee shall, on demand, pay the same."
The situation sometimes arises where the insurer seeks to collect unpaid premiums on
the mortgagor's policy from the mortgagee who is named in the standard mortgage clause.
The liability of the mortgagee turns upon a construction of the last part of the standard
mortgage clause starting with the word "provided." If this language amounts to a covenant
(promise) the mortgagee in possession of the policy is under a duty to pay delinquent
premiums. If this language is a condition, the mortgagee has no duty to pay premiums,
but in case of loss with the policy in arrears the mortgagee cannot collect the proceeds
if the premises are destroyed by fire; his right is dependent upon fulfillment of the condition. The weight of authority holds this to be a condition. Coykendall v. Blackmer,
161 App. Div. 11, 146 N.Y. Supp. 631 (3d Dep't 1914); Whitehead v. Wilson Knitting
Mills, 194 N. C. 281, 139 S. E. 456 (1927). Only two states regard the phrase as a promise.
Stoddart v. Black, 134 Kan. 838, 8 P. 2d 305 (1932); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Upton, 2 N.D. 229, 50 N.W. 702 (1891).
In accident insurance policies providing for a right of autopsy in the insurer if the insured
dies, there is some divergence of opinion as to whether the autopsy clause constitutes a
promise or a condition. Schmiedeke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp. 640 (D. C. Tex.
1940) (promise only); Dvorkin v. Commercial Travelers Ass'n, 258 App. Div. 501, 17
N.Y.S. 2d 109 (1st Dep't 1940) (condition).
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PRECEDENT

AND SUBSEQUENT IN GENERAL CONTRACT LAW

A. In the Field of Substantive Law
The customary definition of the condition precedent is a condition
which "must exist or occur before a duty of immediate performance of
a promise arises .... -I A condition subsequent, on the other hand, is
said to be a condition, the happening of which "will extinguish a duty
to make compensation for breach of contract after the breach has occurred. '
Following through the implications of these conventional definitions
it is discovered that they are broad enough to cover many sets of operative facts which are not normally regarded as conditions precedent or
subsequent. Manifestly the making of an offer, the rendering of an
acceptance, and the transferring of a consideration are all facts which
"must exist or occur before a duty of immediate performance of a promise
arises." The same is true of other facts such as legality of the subject
matter, capacity of the parties, and definiteness of the objectives of the
contract. However, while the definition in terms would cover all these
operative facts, its ordinary meaning has been modified and narrowed
so as to exclude those facts which go to the primary undertaking of the
contract itself. In ordinary connotation the condition precedent refers to
operative facts which must occur after the formation of the promissory
undertaking in order to create the duty of performing the undertaking.'
4. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 250 (a) (1933). In the same section the Restatement
illustrates a condition precedent in this manner: "A writes to B in a distant city, that
if B will advance money to C, A will guarantee repayment by C. B advances the money
as requested. B's sending within a reasonable time, notice to A that the advance has been
made is a condition precedent within the definition of the section. Failure to give such
a notice is a condition subsequent to the existence of a contract; but giving the notice
within a reasonable time is a condition precedent to A's duty to make payment and of
any right of action against him. ...."

5. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 250 (b) (1933). In the same section the Restatement
illustrates a condition subsequent in this manner: "A owes B a matured debt of $100.
B delivers to A his promise under seal that the debt shall be discharged by B's death, If
prior thereto B has taken no steps for its collection. The debt remains due and enforceable;
but B's death is a condition subsequent that will discharge it if no steps have been taken
for its collection. B's death is a condition subsequent, since in view of the sealed release
it will extinguish an existing debt."
6. The Restatement proceeds to explain its original definition of condition precedent
in a comment which narrows the broad scope of the definition so as to bring it In line
with ordinary theoretical formulations. " 'Condition' in ordinary legal use is a word of
broad signification. In its widest sense as a legal term of art it is, 1, any operative fact
that will create some new legal relation or extinguish an existing relation, or, 2, words
or other manifestations that indicate that a fact shall have such an operation. In the
law governing land and chattels the word is often used for an operative fact which affects
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In utilizing the terms "precedent" and "subsequent," however, courts
.and writers have not always followed this customary formulation, with
resultant difficulty. It is hardly possible to manipulate concepts for socially desirable and consistent purposes unless some basic agreement
as to the meaning of the concepts is first attained. Yet, as Professor
Williston points out,7 the term "condition precedent" has been used, contrary to its ordinary meaning, to refer to a set of operative facts, such as
the manifestation of an acceptance, which must occur before the agreement of the parties becomes a binding contract.8 The prevalent view
clearly is, however, that the condition precedent is a prerequisite to a
duty of immediate performance under an already existing contract.0
Difficulties stemming from the imprecision of legal semantics become
even more pronounced when effort is made to explain the so-called condition subsequent.'" Traditionally the condition subsequent is said to
their ownership, or for a provision stating that a fact shall have that operation, as for

example, the condition in a mortgage or in a conditional sale of a chattel. Even when
the use of the word is confined to facts or provisions which have or may have operation
with reference to contractual relations, its logical significance is very broad. Offer, acceptance, consideration, legality and the like are facts that must exist before contractual duties
arise, but unless specific qualifying words are used, it is not customary to call these requirements of the law conditions, and they are not so designated in the Restatement...
the use of the word is confined either to facts the existence of which modifies a promise
or promises, though not necessarily promises which are contractually binding, or to the
manifestations verbal or otherwise that provide for this effect . . .where conditions are
spoken of without restrictive words, it is assumed that a contract has been formed and
the questions involved relate to the duties of the promisor."

REsTrArarar,

CoNrmAcTs

§ 250, comments a and b (1933).
7. 3 WnusTo_, Co~.mcs § 666 A (1936).
8. See Mclsaac v. Hale, 104 Conn. 374, 132 Ad. 916 (1926), defining a condition in
terms of operative facts which must occur prior to a contract springing into existence.
To like effect is Muwaw v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 97 Ohio St. 1, 119 N.E.
132 (1917).
9. "A condition precedent is an operative fact that must exist prior to the existence
of some legal relation in which we are interested. The particular relation most commonly
in mind when this term is used is either the instant and unconditional duty of performance
by a promisor or the secondary duty to pay damages for a breach of such duty of
performance." Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 YALE L.J. 739, 747 (1919).
Prof. Costigan in the TnE PERPMANCE Or CONTRACTS 10 (1911) is substantially in accord

with this view: "A condition precedent, as applied to a condition which goes to performance under a contract in distinction from a condition which goes to the existence
of a contract, is a fact or event which must take place or be waived before the party
whose performance it is to precede owes such performance, i e., before he must perform
or be in default under the contract and liable to an action therefor."
10. The semantic problem in conditions precedent and subsequent is not limited to
the field of contracts. While in property conceptions the terms do have different connotations than in contract law, still the analogous problem of differentiation exists. One
writer reviewing in detail the future interests section of the Restatement of Property has
commented: "Just what is this all-important distinction between a condition which is
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exist in the instance where the parties insert a provision that "the fulfillment of a condition or the occurrence of an event shall discharge them
both from further liabilities under the contract."'" The equivocal nature
of this phraseology is evident, and such a definition, just as in the case
of conditions precedent, is meaningless unless a reference point is selected
to which the "subsequent" character of the condition is to be referred.
The selection of the point of reference is of paramount importance
because the selection of the reference point determines the precedent or
subsequent nature of the "condition"--i.e., the set of operative factswhich is being analyzed. "In one sense, all conditions are subsequent; in
another all are precedent."12 Every condition is subsequent to the operative facts and legal relations which have preceded it, and, conversely,
every condition is precedent to the operative facts and legal relations
which come after it."5 This is readily demonstrable by consideration of
'precedent' and one which is a mere 'basis for defeasance?' Just what difference does It
make to whom and how and why? How does the [American Law] Institute recognize
so easily and so surely that any given limitation 'creates' the one or the other? 'The
statement that a designated occurrence, such as survival, is a "condition precedent" of an
interest means,' answers comment k, § 249, 'that the designated occurrence must happen
before the interest vests, that is, before the interest acquires those characteristics connoted
by the term "vested". . . .' Still, all of these rules about 'characteristics' tell us only
what a court is supposed to do once it has determined whether an 'interest' is subject to
a condition precedent or a condition of defeasance; they offer no criteria by which 'conditions precedent' and 'conditions as a basis of defeasance' can be identified. By what
criteria does the Institute operate and by what criteria is it proposing that courts operate?
Are the same criteria relevant for each of these many practical problems which from the
perspective of policy norms are so totally different? The present volume offers us no
explicit help; its blackletter merely pronounces arbitrarily and summarily . . . that certain
'conditions' are either this or that, fish or fowl." McDougal, Future Interests Restated:
Tradition Versus Clarification and Reform. 55 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1090 (1942). For a
detailed analysis of insurance problems in terms of relevant policy norms, rather than on
the level of legal syntax, see Harnett and Thornton, Insurable Interest in Property: A SocioEconomic Reevaluation of a Legal Concept, 48 COL. L. REV. 1162 (1948).
11. ANSON, CONTRACTS § 358 (2d Am. ed., Huffcut, 1907). Professor Anson gives as an
example of a condition subsequent the bond which he views as a promise subject to or
defeasible upon a condition expressed in the bond. He refers also to the excepted risks
of a charter party, such as the acts of God or of the King's enemies, as conditions
subsequent. In the light of the more modern view that a condition precedent is a prerequisite to a duty of immediate performance, the illlustrations cited by Professor Anson
are conditions precedent since the non-occurrence of the conditions was prerequisite to
the duty of performance.
12. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 316 (1881). One of the earliest and still one of the
best brief analyses of the condition precedent and condition subsequent is that of Justice
Holmes.
13. Professor Corbin defines the types of conditions in these terms: "A condition precedent is an operative fact that must exist prior to the existence of some legal relation In
which we are interested. . . . A condition subsequent is an operative fact that causes the
termination of some previous legal relation in which we are interested." Corbin, Conditions
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one of the traditional conditions precedent, the procurement of an architect's certificate of satisfactory performance as a prerequisite to full payment in the building contract situation. Analytically viewed, it is apparent that this condition, while ordinarily denominated precedent, has
-within it the elements of either a condition precedent or a condition subsequent depending upon the reference point selected. The procuring of the
certificate is subsequent to certain operative facts and legal relations: it is
subsequent to those facts which resulted in the legal relation called the
"offer," subsequent also to those facts which represented the "acceptance," and subsequent to those facts which amounted in legal effect to
"consideration." Yet, at the same time, the procuring of the certificate is
precedent to the promisor's duty to make full payment; precedent to the
payment itself if made, and precedent to any right to commence a law
suit if payment be not made.
Thus it is that the terms "precedent!' and "subsequent" are utterly
devoid of meaning unless related to a known point of reference. 14 A
further complication is that the points of reference which may be selected
are virtually limitless in number. At the nadir is the possible selection
for a reference point of the first initiation of any form of contract negotiation; any condition appertaining to the contract must needs be subsequent to that point. At the zenith is the use as a reference point of the
ultimate performance under the contract, whether primary performance
in the sense of actual completion of the contract or secondary performance in the sense of substituted completion of the contract through payin the Law of Contract, 28 YALE L. 3. 739, 747 (1919).
In the same discussion Corbin points out that the legal relation commonly used as the
reference point when the term condition precedent is used is the duty of performance by

the promisor or the duty to respond in damages for failure to perform. In that sense he
gives the following as examples of conditions precedent: Scott v. Avery, 5 H. L. Cas. 811,
10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1856) (promise to pay such an amount as a third party shall determine; the third party's determination is the condition); Work v. Beach, 13 N. Y. Supp.
678 (Sup. Ct. 1891) (promise to pay as soon as the promisor is able; the financial ability
is the condition); and Granger Co. v. Brown-Ketcham Iron Works, 204 N. Y. 218, 97 N.
E.523 (1912) (promise to pay upon furnishing of certificate by architect; the furnishing of
the certificate is the condition). Corbin also speaks of conditions subsequent as either
subsequent to the primary contractual duty of performance and terminating it, or subsequent to the secondary duty of responding in damages and terminating it. Within his
meanings conditions subsequent are found in Semmes v. Hartford Ins. Co., 13 Wall. 158
(U. S. 1871); Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Conn. 17 (1883); Moody v. Amazon Ins. Co.,
52 Ohio St. 12, 38 N. E. 1011 (1894); Read v. State Ins. Co., 103 Ia. 307, 72 N. W. 665
(1897); and Ward v. Warren, 44 Ore. 102, 74 Pac. 482 (1903).
14. "The terms precedent and subsequent express a relation in time between two facts,
one of which is the legal relation itself; and before using either one of them it is necesary
to determine just what two facts are being considered." Corbin, Conditions in the Law of
Contract, 28 YAL

L. J. 739, 747 (1919).
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ment of damages; any condition is necessarily precedent to that point.
Between these opposite poles of initial negotiation and ultimate performance are many other points which could be used as reference guides,
such as the formation of the contract or the accrual of a duty of performance thereunder. Accordingly as these points are selected, the identical
operative facts will shift from the category "precedent" to the classification "subsequent." Attempting legal analysis without recognizing the
decisive effect of this reference point factor is like trying to local a city
without the aid of geographic meridians and parallels. For, just as
New York is south of New Haven, south of Cambridge, and south of
Montreal, but north of Princeton, north of Charlottesville, and north of
Atlanta, so is any one set of operative facts precedent to some other facts.
but subsequent to still others.
In recognition of the critical importance of the reference point concept,
the leading contract authorities have generally concurred in the selection
of the duty of immediate performance as the reference point. Hence any
condition prior to the springing up of the duty of immediate performance
is conventionally a condition precedent, whereas any condition which
thereafter divests the duty of immediate performance is a condition
subsequent."0 A minority current of authority would, however, not
select the duty of immediate performance as the point of reference, but
rather would choose the existence of the plaintiff's cause of action.1"
When the conventional reference point, the duty of immediate performance, is selected, the condition subsequent becomes indeed a rare
creature. If the other suggested point, the existence of the plaintiff's
cause of action, be adopted, the rare creature becomes extinct. Taking the
15. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 667 (1936). To the same general effect, see COSTI0AN,
PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS 12 (1911). "A condition subsequent . . . is any fact or event
which will relieve the promisor from a default under the contract-i.e., will relieve him
from a cause of action which has accrued against him because performance on his part
became due and has not been given,-or which will affect in any way the cause of action
which arises from such default." Costigan suggests a "rule of thumb" for discovering the
true nature of a condition subsequent in form. The method is to try to phrase the condition in precedent form; if its form can be changed, then, to the extent that It can be
changed, it is not genuinely a condition subsequent.
Some writers deny that there ever can be a condition subsequent. See Ashley, Conditions
in Contract, 14 YALE L. J. 424 (1905). It is believed that the divergent views on the
question are due merely to choice of reference points from which the conditions are
examined.
16. Seemingly this is Ashley's view since he avers there is no such thing as a condition
subsequent, and that extreme position could only be supported on the assumption that the
reference point was the plaintiff's cause of action. See Ashley, supra note 15. Holmes apparently uses a similar point of reference. See HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 317 (1881),
discussing the condition that a policy of insurance shall be void if not sued upon within
one year after default in payment.
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customary duty of immediate performance as the locus, one of the few
genuine condition subsequent situations is the instance where personal
property is sold with the understanding that the vendee may return the
property if it is not satisfactory.17 This instance is a unique blending
of the contract and property conceptions of condition subsequent. While
the relationship grows out of and is dependent upon contractual stipulation, it is also a situation wherein, in the peculiar metaphysics of property law,"8 the title to the property is said to "pass" subject to a "condition of defeasance" which operates to "divest" the title when the vendee
returns the property. It is arguable just how much merit there is in talking in the language of these property terms of ambiguous reference, but
it may at least be stated that in such an instance a duty to pay the purchase price arises when the goods are first sold, and this duty is avoided
by return of the goods. 9 Contrast this genuine condition subsequent with
a situation often regarded as a condition subsequent but which is in fact
a condition precedent. That is the case where a master and servant contract contemplates a hiring for a certain period with the master being
given the right to discharge the servant upon becoming in good faith dissatisfied with his services.20 While often categorized as a condition sub17. Head v. Tattersall, L. R. 7 Es. 7 (1871) (horse sold under contract stipulating that
if warranty not complied with, horse might be returned within a fixed time). See also
Robinson v. Fairbanks, 81 Ala. 132, 1 So. 552 (1887); Kentucky Block Cannel Coal Co.
v. Milroy Milling Co., 208 Ky. 676, 271 S. IV. 1070 (1925). For fuller discussion on this
point, see CrASX, CoNTmAcrs § 240 (4th ed., Throckmorton and Brightman, 1931).
18. The multiplicity of property conceptions of conditions and other factors has at times
been subject to scathing and probably very justified criticism. See Lasswell and McDougal,
Legal Education and Public Policy, 52 YALE L. J. 203, 236 n. 67 (1943): "What empirical
observations can be made to determine whether a mortgagee has 'title,' or whether . . . a
right of way is a 'license' or an 'easement,' or whether a covenant 'touches and concerns,'
or whether a remainder is 'vested,' or whether a group of donees is a 'class' or whether
'title' under a power of appointment comes from the donee or the donor? Does the mortgagee get possession because he has title or does he have title because he gets possession?
. . . Is the promise of a 'right-of-way' revocable because it is a license or is it a license
because it is revocable? Does the covenant run because it touches and concerns or does
it touch and concern because it runs? Is the remainder alienable because it is vested
or is it vested because it is alienable? . . . As Cook has pointed out in Scientific Method
and the Law (1927) 13 A'.B.A.3. 303, 305, we may say that 'all gostaks are doses' and
that 'all doshes are galloons' and conclude with the strictest logic that 'all gostams are galloons' and still not know what we are talking about." Similar criticism might well be
made of the tautological propositions of the legal syntax of insurance lax. See Harnett
and Thornton, Insurable Interest in Property: A Socio-Economic Reevaluation of a Legal
Concept, 48 CoL. L. REv. 1162 (1948).
19. In Head v. Tattersall, L. R. 7 Ex. 7, 14 (1871) the court observed that "The effect of
the contract was to vest the property in the buyer subject to a right of rescission in a
particular event, when it would revest in the seller."
2.0. Chandler, Gardner & Williams, Inc. v. Reynolds, 250 Mass. 309, 145 N. E. 476
(1924); Magee v. Scott & Holston Lumber Co., 78 Minn. 11, 80 N. W. 781 (1899).
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sequent, 2' on the theory that the discharge in good faith avoids a duty
which would otherwise exist to respond in damages for the breach of the
obligation, the true analysis is simply that the master's satisfaction with
the servant's services is a condition precedent to the master's liability.
There is no question of divesting a liability; for no liability accrued
until the performance of the condition precedent, that is, satisfying the
master. Furthermore, the noncompliance with any condition precedent
would entitle a party not to perform, and from this it follows that since
the master had no duty to perform, he is not liable for failing to perform.
B. In the Field of Adjective Law
Upon close analysis it is seen that numerous affirmative defenses such
as accord and satisfaction, fraud, failure of consideration, impossibility
of performance, payment, release, and the Statute of Limitations all
operate in the nature of conditions subsequent. 2 All of these defenses act
to divest a duty of performance which previously existed, and in that
sense they are conditions subsequent. It should be noted that they are not
usually so categorized inasmuch as they are consequences imposed by
operation of law upon certain fact situations, rather than conditions
imposed by the parties themselves. There is a genuine condition subsequent analogous to the Statute of Limitations, however, and that is the
situation where the parties themselves have specified a particular period
within which suit must be brought.3 This time limit is a condition subsequent since it is a condition agreed upon by the parties which operates.
to remove the pre-existing duty of immediate performance.
Theoretically the use of the terms conditions precedent and subsequent is determinative of ihe problems of pleading and proof. The
general rule of pleading is that the plaintiff must set forth in his complaint
all the facts required to make out his cause of action; if he does not so
do, the complaint is demurrable 4 The critical inquiry then is as to.what
facts constitute the cause of action in a suit on a contract. Briefly stated,
the cause of action involves the formation of a valid contract, the due
performance of his part of the contract by the plaintiff, and the failure
of performance by the defendant.
21.

CLARK, CONTRACTS

§ 240 (4th ed., Throckmorton and Brightman, 1931)

takes this

view.
22.

3 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS § 667 (1936).

23. Such a provision is most common in insurance contracts. See, e.g., Semmes v. Hartford Ins. Co., 13 Wall. 158 (U. S. 1871) ; Earnshaw v. Sun Mut. Aid Soc. of Baltimore, 68
Md. 465, 12 AtI. 884 (1888). It is often found also in bills of lading, as in Lyon v. Canadian
Pac. Ry., 264 Mass. 596, 163 NJE. 180 (1928).

24.

Worsley v. Wood, 6 T. R. 710, 101 Eng. Rep. 785 (K. B. 1796); Newton Rubber

Works v. Graham, 171 Mass. 352, 50 N. E. 547 (1898).
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If this general rule of pleading be pursued to its logical terminus, it is
seen that the plaintiff theoretically would have to plead and prove all those
operative facts going to the formation and breach of the agreement, and
to the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant to make restitution
in damages. The rule at common law was an approach to this logical
terminus, and thus it was that the common law required considerable
particularity of pleading in reference to the due performance of conditions. '5

It has never been supposed, however, that the plaintiff must allege and
prove every single fact necessary to the existence of his cause of action.
Theoretically it would seem that the plaintiff should plead and prove that
there was a valid offer, that a binding acceptance was made of this offer
while it was subsisting, that the contract was in the form required by
the Statute of Frauds, that a consideration was present, that the subject
matter of the contract was legal in nature, that the parties had capacity
to contract, that the transaction was free from fraud, duress, or undue
influence, that the obligation has never been released or paid, that the
court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the persons involved,
and that the Statute of Limitations has not run. The existence of all
those factors are actually necessary prerequisites to the plaintiff's recovery, but the plaintiff has never been under an obligation to prove
them all. The doctrine of affirmative defenses enters at this point to relieve the plaintiff of an otherwise intolerable burden by placing upon the
defendant the duty of affirmatively pleading and proving the absence of
many of these prerequisites to plaintiff's recovery if the defendant wishes
to avoid liability.2 6 The effort by the courts is to develop some equitable
25. A mere general allegation of due performance of conditions was insufficient at common law. See Vivian v. Shipping, Cro. Car. 384, 79 Eng. Rep. 935 (K. B. 1634) ; Saunderson v. Bowes, 14 East 500, 104 Eng. Rep. 693 (K. B. 1811). The problem is discussed in
S=mAx, COmmoN-LAw PLEADING 246 (3d ed., Ballantine, 1923). Barring a special statute
or rule of practice the same rule is applied to pleading under the codes. See California Canneries Co. v. Great Western Lumber Co., 44 Cal. App. 69, 185 Pac. 1008, aff'd without
opinion, 207 Pac. 908 (1919); villey v. Cameron, Michel & Co., 217 App. Div. 651, 217
N. Y. Supp. 248 (1st Dep't 1926).
26. The earlier codes made no effort to define when matters had to be brought up by
way of affirmative defense, preferring to let the courts work out the problem according
to common law principles. See CLAsrE, CoDE PLEADING 611 (2d ed. 1947). The later tendency is, however, to incorporate into statutes or rules of practice a working guide for the
courts, as in the New York provision adopted in 1920: "The defendant or plaintiff, as the

case may be, shall raise by his pleading all matters which show the action or counterclaim
not to be maintainable, or that the transaction is either void or voidable in point of law,
and all such grounds of defense or reply, as the case may be, which if not raised would
be likely to take the opposite party by surprise or would raise issues of fact not arissing out
of the preceding pleadings, as, for instance, fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment,
facts showing illegality either by statute, common law or statute of frauds. The applica-
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system of apportioning the burden of pleading and proof between the
parties, the feeling being that some facts are more particularly within the
knowledge or control of one party or another, and hence it is reasonable
to require that party to prove such facts.
Clearly then the plaintiff is never going to be required to establish
every essential element of his right to recover. But, once the magic label
"condition precedent" is affixed by the court to a set of operative facts,
almost inevitably the court will demand that plaintiff plead and prove
those particular facts.17 And, as a corollary to this rule, when the brand
"subsequent" is affixed, the defendant is obliged to plead and prove the
facts constituting the condition.2 8 How lethal this labelling may be is
quickly indicated by the fact that the labelling alone may effectively
decide the course of a case. For instance, one case involved an insurance
policy which provided for payment to the insured's wife as beneficiary if
she survived and otherwise to the insured's estate. The husband and wife
died in a maritime disaster and there was no evidence on the question of
survivorship. It was held that the personal representative of the wife
could not recover on the policy because he was unable to prove the necessary condition precedent-that the insured predeceased the wife."0 Obviously, the actual facts of survivorship were not susceptible of proof;
therefore the party forced to shoulder the burden of proof was necessarily the loser. While the condition problem involved in that case intion of this statute shall not be confined to the instances enumerated." N. Y. CIV. PRAC. AcTr
§ 242. The Connecticut rule is similar: "No facts may be proved under either a general or
special denial except such as show that the plaintiff's statements of fact are untrue. Facts
which are consistent with such statements but show, notwithstanding, that he has no
cause of action, must be specially alleged. Thus, accord and satisfaction, arbitration and
award, coverture, duress, fraud, illegality not apparent on the fact of the pleadings, infancy, that the defendant was non compos mentis, payment, release, the statute of limitations
and res adjudicata must be specially pleaded, while advantage may be taken, under a simple
denial, of such matters as the statute of frauds, or title in a third person to what the plaintiff
sues upon or alleges to be his own." CONN. PRAC. Bx. § 104 (1934). The federal rule is even
more specific in its terminology: "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set
forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk,
contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration,
fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute
of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance
or affirmative defense." FED. R. Civ. P., 8 (c).
27. Newton Rubber Works v. Graham, 171 Mass. 352, So N. E. 547 (1898) ; Colt v.

Miller, 10 Cush. 49 (Mass. 1852).
28. While this is almost always the rule of pleading, a court may occasionally for extrinsic policy reasons or because of pure confused thinking place the burden on the plaintiff
to prove a condition which it has called subsequent. In Kennedy v. Grand Fraternity, 36
Mon. 325, 92 Pac. 971 (1907), the court said that since the plaintiff relied on performance of
a condition subsquent he would have to assume the burden of proof of it.
29.

McGowin v. Menken, 223 N. Y. 509, 119 N. E. 877 (1918).
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volved property connotations, it is still illustrative of the severe effect
which such labelling of conditions may have. Of course, it is true that
oftentimes the codes permit the pleading of conditions in some generalized or simplified form, 0 but this sort of provision in and of itself
does not affect the burden of proof. The provision allows a generalized
wording such as "all conditions precedent have been performed," but
when performance is specifically denied by the adverse party, it must
then be proved.
The great difficulty with this process of labelling conditions in the
adjective law field is that it tends to retard the development of a uniform
and sound system of pleading and proving conditions based on notions of
procedural policy. As it is now, conditions are branded "subsequent" and
"precedent" with effortless abandon, so that what is alleged to be a test
for pleading and proof purposes is no longer a test at all but simply a
description of what the court has done. The label "precedent" or "subsequent" is often attached after the court has decided what the pleading
burden shall be, and, rather than serving as a guide to the court's determination of the procedural question, the words simply explain a result
which the court has reached.3 1

III.

APPRAISAL OF THE CONDITION SUBSEQUENT IN THE INSURANCE
CONTRACT

The insurance contract, while certainly a species of the general contract
family, presents particularly pressing problems in the subject of conditions. The sum of the complex contract plus the multiplicity of conditions, particularly in the typical property insurance policy, inevitably
totals up to a high susceptibility to defenses based on breach of con30. See FED. R. Crv. P., 9 (c): "Conditions Precedent. In pleading the performance
or occurrence of conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions
precedent have been performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or occurrence
shall be made specifically and with particularity." For listing of analagous provisions in
other jurisdictions, see CLARY, CoDE PLE.Anno 281, n. 16 (2d ed. 1947). See also Prof.

Prashker's observations in Pleading Performance of Conditions Precedent: New York and
Federal Rules, 13 ST. Jon's L. REV. 242 (1939).
31. Corbin takes this position in Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 YA L. J. 739,
749 n. 24 (1919), expressing the view that "When the court ishes to throw the burden
of proving the fact upon the defendant it will frequently bring this about by describing the
fact as a condition subsequent!' He illustrates his meaning by discussing the clause often
found in insurance contracts which provides that the policy is to be void if a certain event
occurs or does not occur. The burden of proving that occurrence or non-occurrence is almost
always placed upon the insurer on the theory of condition subsequent, although it is clearly
precedent to any duty of the insurer to make payment. See Benanti v. Delaware Ins. Co.,
86 Conn. 15, 84 AtI. 109 (1912); Moody v. Amazon Ins. Co., 52 Ohio St. 12, 38 N. E.
1011 (1894). A good discussion of the broad problem is found in the dissenting opinion
in Kendall v. Brownson, 47 N. H. 186, 196 (1866).
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dition, with a plethora of technical defenses also weighing in the calculation. Both substantive and procedural implications of the condition,
then, are of substantial importance to the insurance practising bar.
A. What Constitutes a Condition Subsequent
In reality, a very simple rule of thumb may be employed to recognize
the truly designated condition subsequent in the contract of insurance.
It is simply this: of all the conditions found in typical insurance policies,
there is probably only one condition subsequent properly so called, and
that is the usual time limitation provision wherein it is stipulated that no
action is to be brought beyond a fixed period of time. 2 Comparing the
time limitation condition with the accepted definition of condition subsequent we find a reasonable conformity; for though the insurer may
32. Lines 157-61 of the 1943 New York Standard Fire Insurance Policy show a contractual time limitation stipulation. "No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any
claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless all the requirements of this
policy shall have been complied with, and unless commenced within twelve months next
after inception of the loss."
33. Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 56 Okla. 188, 155 Pac. 524 (1915) ; see
Aisenberg v. Royal Ins. Co., 266 Mass. 543, 165 N. E. 682 (1929); Hoffman v. Employer's
Liability Assur. Corp., 146 Ore. 66, 29 P. 2d 557 (1934), citing 3 WXVILSTON, CONTRACTs
§ 667 (1936). Very often the clause is treated but not labelled as condition subsequent.
Semmes v. Hartford Ins. Co., 13 Wall. 158 (U. S. 1871). Although the clause appears In the
courts regularly the courts typically do not speak of "conditions subsequent." Reference
to the various state annotations to the Restatement of Contracts showed many cases
categorized as condition subsequent instances where the express recognition does not appear.
See Pilgrim Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Chism, 49 Ga. App. 121, 174 S. E. 212 (1934) ; Lee
v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 22 Ky. Law Rep. 1712, 56 S. W. 724 (1900); Fullam v.
N. Y. Union Ins. Co., 73 Mass. 61 (1856); Hamilton v. Royal Ins. Co., 156 N. Y. 327,
50 N. E. 863 (1898) ; Everett v. Niagara Ins. Co., 142 Pa. St. 322, 21 AtI. 817 (1891);
Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Lewallen, 46 S. W. 2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Meesman
v. State Ins. Co., 2 Wash. 459, 27 Pac. 77 (1891) ; Duncan v. Federal Union Ins. Co., 114
W. Va. 219, 171 S. E. 418 (1933).
But occasionally courts using the right to ultimate recovery as the point of reference
have labelled the time stipulation as condition precedent. Graham v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co.,
106 Ga. 840, 32 S. E. 579 (1899). See Jackson v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N. Y., 75 Fed. 359,
365 (C. C. A. 5th 1896).
The New York Civil Practice Act § 10 (1) specifially permits parties to set a shorter
limitation time than that of the ordinary statutory period. "The provisions of this article
Twhich sets forth statutory time limitations on various actions] apply and constitute the
only rule of limitation applicable to a civil action or special proceeding, except in one of
the following cases: 1. A case where a different limitation is specially prescribed by law
or a shorter limitation is prescribed by the written contract of the parties." See Brandyce
v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 252 N. Y. 69, 168 N. E. 832 (1929).
In this connection Professor Williston rightly observes that it is of critical Importance
to frame any discussion of conditions in terms of a reference point. For example, while
these limitations of time to sue are almost invariably regarded as conditions subsequent.
i.e., subsequent in time to the duty of performance, they may, by a slight shift In reference
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be faced with the duty of immediate performance, noncompliance with
this condition will divest the insured right.
Arguably, there is another genuine condition subsequent by usual definitions. Assume an insured under a standard type automobile liability
policy has an accident and is sued. His policy has provisions to the effect
that the insurer will defend his suits,34 and further contains a cooperation clause. 5 The injured party successfully prosecutes the suit to judgment, and then returns the judgment unsatisfied. At this point the duty
of the insurance company to perform is immediate.30 Now suppose the
time for appeal not yet having expired, the insurer decides to appeal, but
the insured declines to participate, thus breaching the cooperation clause,
which in turn divests the insurer's liability to the plaintiff injured party. 7
In states38 where the injured party has an independent cause of action
directly against the insurer, and the insured breaches the cooperation
clause after the insurer has suffered judgment in the trial court, there is
obviously a much stronger instance for this argument. In both of the
situations there is a liability accrued, a duty of immediate performance
in the insurer, and it is divested by noncompliance with a condition,
namely the cooperation clause. This is a borderline instance, and the
point terminology, become conditions precedent. If the reference point is made the maintenance of the particular action which the plaintiff brings, then the fact that the time for
bringing suit has not elapsed becomes a condition precedent to that particular action.
This need for clearly specifying the reference point is so obvious that it is surprising that
courts have so often failed to realize it. "The practise is almost universal of using these
terms [condition precedent and condition subsequent] to describe the legal operation of
some fact without mentioning or even clearly considering the particular legal relation to
which the fact is being related in time. The result is most distressing; it leaves the reader
confused and doubtful and it is a cause of conflict in decision, uncertainty of law, and
actual injustice. In one case a fact will be called a condition precedent and in another case
the same fact (or its non-existence) will be called a condition subsequent, because in the
first case it is being subconsciously related to the legal relations that follow it and in the
other case to the legal relations that preceded it." Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 YM.E L. J. 739, 748 (1919).

34. A typical clause is: "Under coverages A and B the company shall defend in his name
and behalf any suit against the insured alleging such injury or destruction and seeLing
damages on account thereof ......
35. The cooperation clause is found in many automobile policies under the heading
"conditions." A common formulation is as follows: "The insured shall cooperate with the
company and upon the company's request, shall attend hearings and trials and -hall assist
in effecting settlements, securing and giving evidence, obtaining the attendance of witnesses
and in the conduct of suits ....

.. "

36. N. Y. Izs. LAw § 167 (1) (b).
37. Hynding v. Home Accident Ins. Co., 214 Cal. 743, 7 P. 2d 999 (1932); Coleman v.
New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N. Y. 271, 160 N. E. 367 (1928); Schoenfeld v. New Jersey
Fid. Ins. Co., 203 App. Div. 796, 197 N . Y. Supp. 606 (2d Dep't 1922).
38. On the state of authority in these states see 12 Wis. L. RPm. 531 (1937).
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difficulty here in measuring the meaning of "duty of immediate performance" demonstrates an ambiguity in the traditional analyses of
conditions, such as that of the Restatement, 9 for while duty of immediate performance is in one sense a duty pursuant to judgment, the insurer's duty may also be said to be subject to the terms of the insurance
contract.
The corollary of the proposition so severely limiting the number of
conditions properly called subsequent, is the recognition that practically
all the conditions in insurance contracts are precedent in the accepted
sense; the insurer has no duty of immediate performance unless the
condition has been fulfilled. This may be illustrated by consideration of
the warranty question. In the law of insurance, "warranty" does not connote the promissory undertaking of the sales warranty, but rather serves
as a condition of the insurer's promise. Realization that the insurance
warranty can operate only as a condition precedent4" has led the New
York courts to apply the warranty statute4 ' to conditions precedent, including both statements by the insured which are made a term of the
contract, and clauses inserted by the insurer.4 2
It should now seem that the problem when measured in true perspective is fraught with no difficulty. In actual practice the contractual
time limitation stipulation is the sole true condition subsequent, and the
vast bulk of conditions are precedent. 43 But, unhappily, the simple
verity of this conclusion has been obfuscated because of faulty analysis
and because of the admixture of procedural considerations.
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 250 (1933) notes 4, 5 and 6 supra.
40. Patterson, Warranties in Insurance Law, 34 COL. L. REV. 595, 597 (1934).
41. N. Y. INS. LAW § 150 (1) reads in part: "The term 'warranty' as used in this section,
means any provision of an insurance contract which has the effect of requiring, as a condition precedent of the taking effect of such contract or as a condition precedent of the Insurer's liability thereunder, the existence of a fact which tends to diminish or the nonexistence of a fact which tends to increase the risk of occurrence of any loss, damage, or
injury within the coverage of the contract. . . . " It is to be noted that the term condition
precedent is used to include conditions of the both levels.
42. Glickman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 291 N. Y. 45, 50 N. E. 2d 538 (1943). The
Massachusetts view is contra: Kravit v. United States Cas. Co., 278 Mass. 178, 179 N. E.
399 (1932).
43. Instances of the condition precedent are obvious. Schuster v. National Surety Co.,
256 N. Y. 150, 175 N. E. 655 (1931) (undertaking to keep a watchman on touring dutyburglary policy) ; Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Md. v. Friedlander, 101 F. 2d 106 (C. C. A.
6th 1939) (requirement that a custodian and one other employee be on duty-robbery
policy) ; Arbuckle v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. of Ill., 129 F. 2d 791 (C. C. A.
2d 1942) (principal place of garage-automobile liability policy) ; Fowler v. Aetna Fire
Ins. Co., 6 Cow. 673 (N. Y. 1827) (brick house-fire insurance policy).
39.
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1. Difficulties Arising from Improper Points of Reference
Some courts have adopted the position that conditions to be performed
subsequent to the formation of the contract are conditions subsequent.
"If there be conditions in a policy of insurance which must be performed
before its risk attaches, such conditions are recognized as precedent ones
...but after the contract has come into legal existence, and has attached
as a binding obligation, those warranties or conditions which afford a
means whereby the obligation of the insurer may be extinguished are
regarded as conditions subsequent .... I'l Language of this sort indicates an adoption of the formation of the contract as the point of reference from which to label conditions. Selection of this reference point is
contrary to the ordinary demarcation line which is drawn at the accrual
of a duty of performance.4 5 The selection is also difficult to defend in
terms of theoretical symmetry because in insurance contracts the most
important prerequisite to liability, which is almost universally regarded
as a condition precedent-the loss itself-occurs after the formation of
the contract. To be perfectly consistent, a court taking the formation
of the contract as its point of reference would be forced to call the
occurrence of the loss a condition subsequent.
2. Difficulties Arising from Form of the Language
The condition subsequent carries with it the idea of divesting a right
which has accrued but has not yet been enforced. The persistency of
this notion leads to an improper evaluation of the true condition precedent expressed in a form which suggests condition subsequent. The condition precedent in condition subsequent form is expressed in this manner,
"If occurrence p does (or does not) happen, this policy shall be null and
void." In terms of conventional analysis, such conditions are precedent
in that their existence or non-existence is prerequisite to any duty of
immediate performance by the insurer.4 This may be instantly seen by
44. Port Blakely Aill Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 50 Wash. 657, 664, 97 Pac. 781,
783 (1908). For language indicating a simiar effect see Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v.
Nichols, 224 U. S. 346 (1911)

and Brashears v. Perry County Farmer's Protective Ins.

Co., 51 Ind. App. 8, 98 N. E. 889 (1912).
45. See note 7 supra.
46. A provocative analysis of this kind of condition appears in Ashley, Conditions in
"
. . . suppose A promises to pay B $1,00 on
Contract, 14 YrE L. J. 424, 425 (1905).
June 1 next, the obligation to become void if a certain ship reaches New York harbor before
June 1. In such a case the courts have said that there is a condition subsequent and that

consequently as the obligation subsists it must be incumbent upon the defendant to show
that it has been terminated. The error lies in supposing that there is a subsisting obligation,
but if one says that the contract, as such, is the obligation which is referred to, then
it must follow that we can have no such thing as a condition precedent in contract,
because there certainly must be a contract in existence, if one is to have a limitation upon
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inserting content into "occurrence"; for instance, the storage of gasoline
on the premises,47 vacancy of the premises,4 8 alteration,40 cessation of
operation,50 over-insurance in fire insurance"' policies; rental status"2 in
automobile insurance; or change of occupation 3 in life insurance. Under
all of the above clauses, if the insured has not complied with the condition, the insurer is not bound to immediate performance, namely the
rendition of the agreed exchange on the happening of an insured event."1
it. There cannot be such a thing as construing the terms of such contract unless there are
such terms. Yet in the case of conditions precedent the uncertain event happens before there
is any obligation to perform, but nevertheless there is a subsisting contract. Conditions in
contract do not cause an existing obligation to terminate and there is no such thing as a
condition subsequent in this class of obligations. Thus in the illustration given above It Is
clear that the contract as to the payment of the $1,000 on June 1 subsists, but it is equally
clear that until June 1 there is no obligation to pay the $1,000, and there will never be
such an obligation unless the time passes without the arrival of the ship-that is to say,
the obligation to pay does not arise unless there is a non-arrival of the ship, and such nonarrival is a condition precedent." Note the unequivocal statement that "there is no such
thing as a condition subsequent . . . " and compare the views of Professor Williston, notes
7 and 15 supra, and Professor Costigan, note 15 supra.
47. Bailey v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 166 W. Va. 544, 182 S. E. 288 (1935).
48. Farmer's and Merchant's Ins. Co. v. Bodge, 76 Neb. 31, 106 N. W. 1004 (1906).
49. Hill v. Middlesex Mut. Assur. Co., 174 Mass. 542, 55 N. E. 319 (1899).
50. Stone v. Howard Ins. Co., 153 Mass. 475, 27 N. E. 6 (1890).
51. Meyers v. German Fire Ins. Co., 101 Neb. 855, 166 N. W. 247 (1917).
52. Borsky v. National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 119 Neb. 178, 227 N. W. 821
(1929).
53. Quick v. Modern Woodmen of America, 91 Neb. 106, 135 N. W. 433 (1912).
54. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 259 (1933). "When a condition is precedent though expressed in subsequent form.

"Words qualifying a promise that in form state that a fact is a condition subsequent
mean, when properly interpreted, that non-existence of the fact is a condition precedent,
unless the fact is an occurrence that can consistently with the terms of the promise take
place after a duty of immediate performance has arisen, and an intention is clearly
manifested that the occurrence shall be a condition subsequent.
"Comnent: a. Conditions subsequent to the transfer of ownership of land or chattels are

not uncommon; but by definition [see § 250 (b)] a condition subsequent as used In the
Restatement of the present Subject extinguishes a duty of immediate performance. A condition that terminates a contract before performance is due is included under conditions pre-

cedent, since the failure of the event to happen is a prerequisite to the existence of a duty
of immediate performance. Conditions of the latter sort are of frequent occurrence; and
in early times it became customary to write bonds in a form stating that there was a duty
of immediate performance, which nevertheless would be discharged on the occurrence of a
condition, the 'grant' of a debt being regarded as analogous to the transfer of land. This
form of expression is still common in legal documents, partly because of a tendency to
adhere to old forms, and partly because contractors fail to distinguish between the primary
duty that is created at the formation of a contract and the duty of immediate performance
that often does not exist until long afterwards. Words are often used, therefore, the literal
meaning of which would make some fact a condition subsequent to the duty of Immediate
performance, though the parties really mean to make its non-occurrence a condition
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But some courts, in practice, have been misled by formal appearance,
failing to observe the essential amorphism of the pattern. Thus, one court
said, "conditions which provide that the policy shall become void or inoperative, or the insurer wholly or partially relieved from liability...
if they may properly be called conditions . . . are conditions subsequent. ... ," That imprecise language of this sort is not without repercussion is evidenced by cases holding that conditions voiding policies for
alienation"O are subsequent.
Perhaps the foremost illustration of improper analysis in this area is
the construction adopted by some courts that payment of premiums is a
condition subsequent in life insurance policies. 57 The general rationale
underlying this improper view is based on property concepts, an assumption that the policy was once valid (vested), but that breach of conditions rendered the valid policy void (divested). The impropriety of
blind use of property law characterization here leads to bad contract
58
law.
3. Difficulties Arising from the Underlying Tissue of Procedural Purpose
In the action of covenant at common law performance of conditions
precedent had to be alleged by the plaintiff, while conditions subsequent
precedent to such duty. So extraordinary, however, is an intention that a party to a contract shall be under a duty of immediate performance while a fact is still uncertain, on
the existence of which the duty and any right of action for breach thereof ceases, that the
clearest language is necessary to justify an interpretation giving that meaning to a contract.
Generally, therefore, the form in which the requirement of a condition is stated is disregarded
except with reference to procedure!'
55. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Zimmer, 19 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 18S, 26 Ohio Dec. 327, ajf'd,
97 Ohio St. 14, 119 N. E. 136 (1916). Cf. Rosenblum v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada,
51 Wyo. 195, 65 P. 2d 399 (1937), holding a clause similar to that in the Zimmer case was
a condition precedent. These cases involve the customary "delivery in good health clause"
of the life insurance policy. In reality, these are conditions of the first level, conditions which
must exist for a building contract to spring into existence.
56. Oakes v. Manufacturers Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 135 Mass. 248 (1853). See Couch
v. Fidelity-Pheniax Ins. Co., 220 Ky. 802, 295 S. W. 1054 (1927) (if property encumbered,
policy null and void).
57. Sands v. New York Life Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 626, 10 Am. Rep. 535 (1872). Contra:
Worthington v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 41 Conn. 372 (1874). See Pitt v. Bershire
Life Ins. Co., 100 Mass. 500 (1868).
58. For an enlightening discussion of the problem of non-payment of life insurance
premiums because of war time hindrances, see Mulligan, Does War Excuse the Payment of
Life Insurance Premiums? 17 Foreo. L. REv. 63 (1948): Mr. Mulligan correctly points out
(at pp. 75 and 76) that payment of premiums is really a condition precedent; he cites 3
W=Tsroy, Coracrs § 667 (1936) for the proposition that the condition is subsequent in
form, but for the purpose of pleading and proof only. The burden of proving non-payment
is on the insurer. Liesny v . Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147 App. Div. 253, 131 N. Y. Supp.
1087 (4th Dep't 1911).
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were matters for affirmative defense 9 This procedural framework has
been carried over into modern practice, and the plaintiff is thus obliged
to allege performance of conditions precedent, while the defendant bears
the pleading burden as to conditions subsequent. 0° But, starting from
this base, it is soon observed that many courts wish the insurer to allege
and often prove certain breaches of condition, without regard to the
nature of the condition. It is when a court desires to make a condition
which is properly a condition precedent a matter of affirmative defense
for the insurer to prove that the phenomenon of the condition subsequent
procedurally arises. That is, a true condition precedent is termed a condition subsequent so that the procedural rules applicable to conditions
subsequent will apply to a condition that is rightfully precedent.0 1
In analyzing the case law s it is manifest that this underlying procedural motivation is the principal cause of incorrectly labelled conditions.
So widespread is this tendency that the Restatement of Contracts observes
in speaking of the condition precedent expressed in subsequent form:"0
"In an action on a promise stated in absolute terms, but followed by the
further statement that the duty will be terminated if a certain contingency
occurs, the form of the statement may have the effect of throwing the
burden of pleading or of proof on the defendant, whereas the plaintiff
must ordinarily plead and prove the happening of conditions precedent."0 4
Running through the case law is a definite attempt by the courts to
lighten the burden of the insured so far as pleading and proof goes. One
technique of solving the insured's pleading hardship appears in Moody v.
Amazon Insurance Co.0 5 The court there held that the insured need only
59. Hotham v. East India Co., I. T. R. 638 (1787).
60. Moody v. Amazon Ins. Co., 52 Ohio St. 12, 15, 38 N. E. 1011, 1012 (1894).
61. Ibid.
62. As in Moody v. Amazon Ins. Co., 52 Ohio St. 12, 38 N. E. 1011 (1894). To the same
effect is Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Zimmer, 19 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 188, 26 Ohio
Dec. 327, 328, aff'd, 97 Ohio St. 14, 119 N. E. 136 (1916) where the court remarked: "Conditions which provide that the policy shall become void, or inoperative, or the insurer
wholly or partially relieved from liability are . . . matters of defense . . . which . . . must
be pleaded by the insurer to defeat recovery." The court in the Moody case spells out an
argument based on the unfairness and inconvenience of requiring the plaintiff insured to
prove all conditions under a general denial, and this is in view of the multiplicity of conditions in an insurance policy. The court thus denies the clause is precedent because the
plaintiff should not have the burden of proof, drawing the precedent-subsequent distinction
right there. However, the clause involved was an occupancy clause of a fire insurance policy,
a warranty which is a true condition precedent substantively viewed.
63. The internal relationship of the form of the condition and the procedural burden
is obvious. These two ideas have been set forth in separate sections above merely for
analytical purposes.
64. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 259, comment b (1933).
65. 52 Ohio St. 12, 38 N. E. 1011 (1894).
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prove the policy, proof of interest, loss, and furnishing proof of loss in
order to show a prima facie liability of the insurer to pay. The court,
however, then proceeded to the unnecessary conclusion that those few
conditions are the precedent ones, and the rest, which the insurer must
prove, are subsequent. There are two other solutions with a substantial
similarity. The first is a relaxation of common law rules, leaving the
proof burden with the insured, but allocating the pleading burden to the
insurer.6 6 A second solution is the New York method, 7 utilized in over
half of the states, which consists of a statutory scheme allowing allegation
of conditions precedent in general terms and requiring the insurer specifically to traverse. The insured is deemed to have proved all conditions
not so traversed, but must carry the burden of proof on conditions properly denied. Rule 9268 of the New York Rules of Civil Practice specifically uses the term condition precedent.
The moral of this story is clear: when the courts, with varying notions
of public policy, commence labeling conditions as "subsequent" in order
to shift the burden of pleading and proof to the defendant insurer, unnecessary complication ensues. Thus, the procedural effect of conditions
subsequent has been given to clauses making policies null and void for
false swearing; breaches of such clauses are matters of affirmative defense
to be asserted and proved by the insurer.6" The same result is reached
with clauses making policies null and void except where the loss occurs
through the contingency insured against."
66. Benanti v. Delaware Ins. Co., 86 Conn. 15, 84 AtI. 109 (1912).
67. N. Y. R. Civ. PRc., Rule 92 (1948): "The performance or occurrence of a condition
precedent in a contract may be pleaded in general terms as a legal conclusion without stating

the facts constituting performance or occurrence. A denial of such allegation of performance
or occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity. In case of such denial the
party pleading the performance or occurrence shall be required to prove on the trial only
such performance or occurrence as shall have been so specified.1'
68. Ibid.

69. Home Ins. Co. v. Winn, 42 Neb. 331, 60 N. W. 575 (1894); Benanti v. Delaware
Ins. Co., 86 Conn. 15, 84 Ati. 109 (1912). Note that the same procedural effect of making
false statements by the insured on matters of affirmative defense iwas achieved in part in
Rosenblum v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 51 Wyo. 195, 65 P. 2d 399 (1937) even though the condition was called precedent. The court simply declared that the delivery of the policy by
the insurer raised a presumption of good faith so that the insurer had the burden of making
an affirmative showing to the contrary.
In view of the general procedural necessity of alleging fraud as an affirmative defense
entirely apart from the question of condition, there is an additional ground for requiring the
insurer to carry the burden of proof on the question of false statements. For a fuller
discussion of the general policy considerations surrounding the defense of fraud in insurance
contracts, see Harnett, Misrepresentation in Life Insurance Applications: An Analysis of
the Kansas Law and a Proposal for Refor,n, 17 J.B. A. K.,. 214 (1948).
70. Western Assur. Co. of Toronto v. Mfohlman Co., 83 Fed. 811 (C. C. A. 2d 1897) (fire
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The courts have been generally consistent in placing the burden of
proof of conditions labelled subsequent on the defendant insurer. However, even this consistency is marred by occasional aberration. Thus in a
case where plaintiff's life insurance policy had lapsed for non-payment
and he relied on a reinstatement clause, the court constructed this peculiar skein of illogic: "Plaintiff . ..relying on performance of a condition subsequent . . . must assume the burden of proof on that
question."'"
B. Implications of the Condition Subsequent
1. Substantive Implications
The substantive implication of the condition subsequent in the insurance contract is almost completely negative, primarily because of the
nebulous semantics employed and the intangibility of the term "duty of
immediate performance." The distinction between conditions precedent
and subsequent is of minute utility. However, there are certain facets of
advantages to be found in the usage, although the disproportion of
confusion entailed may be said largely to outweigh these advantages.
It has been argued that the distinction is of use to contracting parties
in knowing whether they have an immediate duty to perform, or whether
they may await further action by their opposite members before they
themselves must perform. The predictability, of course, is completely
nullified by the verbal whirlpool, and it is doubtful how much reliance
can ever be put in the supposed distinction.
A necessity for distinction on the substantive plane exists, however,
at least for unearthing conditions not governed by the warranty statutes;
this need arising because of the assimilation of warranty and condition
precedent, and the antinomy between conditions precedent and subsequent. Perhaps another substantive utility of the term condition subsequent is the greater possibility of a judicial discovery of waiver where
the condition is felt to be subsequent rather than precedent. Actually a
property law simile is effected to achieve this result. The insured is regarded as having a vested right which is being divested. In furtherance
of the general judicial disfavor of the forfeiture, the waiver road is less
rocky when the destination is subsequent rather than precedent.7 2 This
judicial preference cannot be ignored; witness the example of Justice
Holmes, the famous disbeliever in the condition subsequent. In a case7a
policy). The court seemed particularly concerned that the insurer have the burden of proof.
See also Port Blakely Mill Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 50 Wash. 657, 97 Pac. 781 (1908).
71. Kennedy v. Grand Fraternity, 36 Mont. 325, 92 Pac. 971 (1907).
72. See Thompson v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 252 (1881); cf. Stonewall Life Ins. Co.
v. Cooke, 165 Miss. 619, 144 So. 217 (1932).
73. Oakes v. Manufacturers' Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 135 Mass. 248 (1883).
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where the condition voided the policy if the insured premises were
alienated, Justice Holmes held what was truly a condition precedent to
be a condition subsequent, and then remanded the case for admission
of parol evidence on the question of waiver.
2. Procedural Implications
Procedurally, condition subsequent has clear meaning; it means burden
of proof. Conditions subsequent are matters of affirmative defense, with
all the attendant consequences.7 4 The procedural import is significant
to all practitioners, though the writers often neglect its practical proportions. For example, Rule 92 of the New York Rules of Civil Practice
allows allegation of performance of conditions precedent in general terms,
but does not deal with conditions subsequent; therefore, a blanket allegation under Rule 92 is not an averment of compliance with a condition
subsequent. As previously analyzed, the time limit stipulation is probably
the only proper condition subsequent in insurance contracts,75 and it
would not be covered by a general averment under such a rule.
An important inquiry is whether there can exist in a jurisdiction like
New York a condition subsequent procedurally. This designation, as previously indicated, means a true condition precedent which is treated for
procedural purposes as subsequent so as to mitigate the hardship of the
insured being required to plead and prove the numerous conditions of
the average insurance policy. But the erection of the verbal mutant, the
condition subsequent procedurally,is merely the response of some courts,
as in the previously discussed Mloody case. Other jurisdictions have
acted by statute, and Rule 92 is the New York answer to the hardship
problem. In the face of a definite expression of legislative intent to
ameliorate hardship by adoption of a particular device, it is felt that the
courts would be acting improperly to smuggle conditions precedent out
of Rule 92 in containers marked "condition subsequent." ' This argu74. By provisions of the New York Civil Practice Act § 274, the court is empowered to
direct a reply to an affirmative defense. Because of the confusion surrounding the status of
the condition subsequent and the effect of Rule 92, the way is open for dilatory and obstructive practices by wholesale advancement of supposed affirmative defenses, which in
reality are merely specific denials under Rule 92. These "defenses" can have the effect of
bewildering the inexperienced insurance counsel as well as drawing an undeserved compelled reply from the court. Clear appreciation of the nature of the condition subsequent
can forestall this sort of conduct which impedes just solutions.
75. Huckins v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. of N. Y., 59 N. Y. S. 2d 755 (City Ct. 1946).
Although the procedural setting is not completely clear from the opinion, the court seems

to hold that the time limit stipulation is a condition precedent and must be alleged within
Rule 92. It is submitted that this result is incorrect.
76. The law of Missouri seems otherwise. Mueller v. Putnam Fire Ins. Co., 45 Mo. 84
(1869) decided that conditions subsequent in form were matters of affirmative defense. The
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ment of legislative intent is borne out by the situation surrounding the
typical cooperation clause." While this clause viewed in its usual context is a true condition precedent, courts eager to thrust the burden of
proof on the insurer have rendered this a condition subsequent procedurally.78 But in New York the legislature, recognizing the desirability
of the insurer proving lack of cooperation, has expressly put the burden
on the insurer by statute." Legislative intent to occupy the remedial
field would seem to curb the judicial role.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The use of the terms "condition precedent" and "condition subsequent"
in construction of insurance contracts has served only to breed confusion
and difficulty. Courts have labelled identical operative facts "precedent"
in one situation and "subsequent" in another, and have failed even to
follow a consistent pattern on the level of purely legal analysis.
It is semantically possible to draw a line between conditions by selecting an agreed point of reference. The point chosen by the majority
position is the duty of immediate performance of the obligation of the
contract. The selection of this point means that for all practical purposes
the only condition in an insurance contract that is a condition subsequent
is the time limit clause, for this is the only one which operates to divest
a liability previously existing.
In view of the present status of the law it is necessary for the lawyer
to understand the legal syntax which operates to categorize conditions
as precedent or subsequent. Such understanding is necessary because
statutes often refer to these conditions,80 and unless the lawyer is familiar with the traditional labellings he will be unable to comprehend the
scope and effect of the statutes. Then too the legal language is so thor.oughly infiltrated with these terms that knowledge of them is essential
to an understanding of the senses in which they are used by courts and
insurance lawyers.
But, while present-day legal advocacy requires an understanding of
these terms, it is believed that the long-range objective should be their
elimination from the insurance vocabulary. Use of the terms has no
utility whatever on the level of substantive law. They serve to effectuate
no basic policy goal in substantive law. Rather do they militate against
statute requiring the pleading and proof of conditions precedent by plaintiff was Mo. Rv.
STAT. § 807 (1929).

77. See note 35 supra.
78. Koontz v. General Cas. Co. of America, 162 Wagh. 77, 297 Pac. 1081 (1931).
79.
So.

N. Y. INs. LAW, § 167 (5).
As for example, N. Y. R. Civ. PRAc., Rule 92, already discussed.
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the policy values of clarity and definiteness in the law. Substantively
speaking, it is of no use to labor constructing possible hairline syntactical
distinctions which are drawn only with difficulty in all cases and erroneously so in many instances. The labor is wasted, for the line when drawn
means nothing substantively anyway.
On the procedural level the terms, from a long-range view, have also
no utility. So long as procedural statutes and rules are framed in terms
of conditions precedent and subsequent, the lawyer cannot afford to
discard the terms, of course, but he can still recognize their essential
lack of meaning and strive for their elimination. It is thought that the
words "precedent" and "subsequent" are guides to the determination of
the burdens of pleading and proof. Actually, they are not. Sophisticated
courts freely call a condition, which from theoretical analysis is a precedent one, a condition subsequent when they desire to shift the burden
of proof to the defendant. Thus "condition subsequent" at best is a name
which these courts apply to the condition aftcr they have decided that
the defendant must plead and prove it. An unsophisticated court, on the
other hand, or one bound by the iron hand of past decisions, may feel
obliged to call a condition "precedent" and thus feel compelled contrary
to its best policy judgment to put the burden of pleading and proving
the condition on the plaintiff because traditionally conditions precedent
must be proved by the plaintiff. In both instances sound policy and legal
analysis have been discarded. In the one case the court has reached its
own independent decision on the burden of proof and denominated the
condition accordingly; in the other case the court has felt bound to ignore
its own feelings as to a just burden of proof because it has labelled the
condition in a way which traditionally requires a certain burden of proof
allocation.
But what is the utility of all the procedural necromancy? What possible connection is there from the policy viewpoint between the problem
of drawing hair-line verbal distinctions between conditions and the problem of an equitable distribution of the burden of proof? The burden of
proof question is an entirely different and independent problem of deciding what operative facts should be proved by the plaintiff and what by
the defendant. The words "precedent" and "subsequent" are not philosophers' stones which in some magic way answer the problem of burden
of proof. It is not within the scope of this article to lay down detailed
regulations for determining what kind of facts a plaintiff or defendant
must prove, but suffice it to say that the problem of working out an
equitable apportionment of this burden is in no way associated with the
problem of what conditions are precedent and what subsequent. Extrinsic
policy factors, such as the availability of evidence to one side or another,

244

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

the relative positions of the parties, and similar factors, should be the
criteria utilized in determining burden of pleading and proof. The courts
and legislatures should be allowed to work out independently in each
jurisdiction and in each type of case what they consider to be an equitable
balancing of the burden of proof, and in so doing they should not be
encumbered by the meaningless vestigia of condition precedent and condition subsequent.
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